European Restructuring Part Two: New Boots and Contracts

By: Dan | May 27th, 2009

The decision to expand the UEFA Champions League was one of the most significant in the modern history of the European game. As discussed in part one, the emergence of vast sums of television money fundamentally altered the club landscape in favor of the richest and most powerful. After systematically robbing Europe’s smaller leagues and clubs of the means to compete with the big clubs, the same big clubs had the gall to complain that being forced to play against the smaller clubs made for an inferior, and more importantly, unprofitable, competition.

The first casualty of the great restructuring was the Cup Winners’ Cup. An expanded Champions League probably spelled doom for this competition no matter what. No one wanted to be left out of the rush to the Champions League ATM, so a potential domestic runner up and cup winner would opt for the Champions League, leaving a beaten finalist to fill the nation’s CWC spot. The Dutch league provided the first example of how this would backfire in the long run. In 1997-98, PSV and Ajax, who both qualified for the Champions League, also contested that season’s cup final. Defeated semi-finalists Heerenveen became Holland’s entrant in the following Cup Winners’ Cup. Once the expanded Champions League allowed more than two teams, the potential for multiple repeats of this situation made the entire competition untenable. The fragmentation of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia introduced a larger number of competitors into the competition. An influx of comparative minnows provided an out for the bigger nations; the marquee value was diminished, so there was simply not enough money to be made to justify the hassle of the CWC fixtures.

The UEFA Cup also suffered from being branded a ‘devalued’ competition. In practice, the UEFA was always a ‘best of the rest’ situation, but as ‘the rest’ of the larger leagues ended up in the Champions League, the UEFA Cup found itself lacking big names. In turn, this has led to some teams, usually English clubs with pretensions of Champions League qualification, complaining that the UEFA Cup fixtures weren’t profitable enough to justify full strength participation. In fairness, the addition of a nonsensical group stage and the presence of Champions League drop-ins did make progressing through the tournament a much more convoluted affair. Generally, the UEFA Cup has more admirers than detractors. In terms of the on field product, the UEFA Cup has thrived despite the lack of big names. The chance for a variety of smaller clubs to test themselves in European competition has also been a happy, if unintended, side effect.

Of course, in the new Europe, the Champions League is firmly set in the brightest spotlight. If you happen to be a fan of the ten clubs that have a prayer of winning the thing, or just happen to be a neutral that gets very excited by seeing big names in close proximity to each other, the Champions League has been a smashing success. For everyone else, the monotony is wearing incredibly thin. Having dominant teams, in and of itself, is not the issue. The old format saw many clubs carve out a historical niche by dominating the competition. The problem with the Champions League format is the inherent protectionism of the big clubs. The prospect of being dumped out by a surprising opponent has all but disappeared from the competition thanks to the group stages. During the 07-08 season, Liverpool took one point from their first three group games. Let’s assume that under the old format that such an underwhelming performance would have meant a first round exit. Under the current format, a big team would have to suffer these shock results over the course of the entire group stage, four months, to risk an early exit. Surprise results do happen during the group stages; this past season saw inspired performances by Cluj and Famagusta that ultimately had no effect on the progress of the larger clubs whatsoever. It’s almost shocking that the big clubs consented to the elimination of the second group stage. In those dark days, a club could actually defy the odds and survive the group stage, as FC Basel did in 02-03, sending Liverpool to the UEFA Cup in the process, and be rewarded with a second group featuring Manchester United and Juventus. The anarchy that erupted in 03-04, when Porto and Monaco contested the final (and were joined in the semi-finals by Deportivo La Coruna) must have prompted mass panic.

It’s somewhat unfortunate that the current restructuring taking place had to go down the social engineering route, as the allegations of collusion and conspiracy are far too easily tossed around. As the massive changes that have taken place are not reversible, a measure of parity has to be externally introduced. Only time will tell if the reworked format will make any difference, or be joined by further measures like the 6 + 5 rule, but the fact that anyone at UEFA was willing to upset the apple cart by admitting there was a problem, let alone actually doing anything about it is a small step in the right direction.

One thing that is certain is that the latest reorganization is merely the precipice to conflict between the UEFA hierarchy and the G-14 successor organization the European Club Association. Michel Platini has declared, on record, that if the decision were his alone, he would restore the open draw knock-out format to European competition. For the clubs’ part, declarations about the ‘inevitability’ of the super league, along with a proposed structure, have made the news in recent months. The implications of the latest super league proposal are an entirely separate issue, complicated and numerous as they are. The key points to extract from the latest plans are that they include a larger number of clubs and that the participating clubs now intend to continue in their respective domestic leagues. There are a few positive indicators to take away from this; the expanded nature of the super league plans constitutes a tacit admission not only that the monotony on display in the current Champions League is dissatisfying to a significant base of ‘consumers,’ but that clubs that have found their status reduced in the modern economic climate remain appealing to fans. That the super league plans also include remaining in UEFA sanctioned competitions means that the breakaway element is now a negotiating strength for UEFA, not the elite group of clubs.